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PREFACE 
In the coming years the world will be undergoing a major structural 
transformation as the size, composition, and geographic distri- 
bution of industry changes under the influence of: 
o increases in factor prizes: energy, labor; 
o depletion of resources: minerals, cheap liquid fuels; 
o changes in technology: microelectronics, biotechnology; 
o industrialization of the LDCs. 
The already-industrialized nations, whose industrial structure 
was shaped by relatively inexpensive energy and easy access 
to resources, will find certain sectors losing competitiveness 
to newly-industrialized nations with access to similar technolo- 
gies, and cheaper labor. The newly-industrializing nations will 
strive to increase their portion of the global industrial pie, 
while the industrialized nations will compete with each other 
to preserve their shares. At the same time, population increase 
and economic development will place new demands both for employ- 
ment and for goods on the industrial system. 
At the national level, this transformation will affect economic 
growth, employment, regional development, balance of payments, 
R&D, and many other sensitive constituents of national well-being. 
For the small economies that have a relatively large foreign trade 
sector, the transformation can be traumatic. Even the large, 
autarkic economies will face substantial challenges. 
IIASA is now beginning an exploration of the role that it might 
play in analyzing and improving understanding of the global and 
national issues arising from this transformation of the inter- 
national industrial structure. One part of the exploration has 
iii 
been the commissioning of a series of papers by outside specialists. 
A central question for all nations in the face of the industrial 
transformation is: what strategy should be followed to maximize 
the prospects of national well-being, given the anticipated 
changes? The third paper in the series addresses this question 
for a small socialist nation with an open economy, linked both 
to the CMJZA and the convertible currency markets. Its author, 
Prof. Bela Csikos-Nagy, is a leading Hungarian economist. He 
was among the experts who developed one of the most far reaching 
economic reforms ever in a socialist country - that of 1968 in 
Hungary. At present he is the President of the National Office 
for Prices and Materials and a lecturer at the Karl Marx-University 
of Economics in Budapest. 
Roger E. Levien 
Director 
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INTRODUCTION 
A short summary of Hungarian economic development in the 
last 30 years is given as an introduction to the discussion of 
current problems. Deputy Minister Professor  la ~sik6s-~agy 
discusses the different phases of post war development: the 
extensive industrialization between 1950-1967, the so called 
"golden age of the Hungarian economy" resulting from the economic 
reform of 1968, and the sudden shock caused by the energy crisis 
in 1973. As a consequence of the oil price explosion, Hungary 
lost around 10% of her national income overnight. After the 
initial -unsuccessful- reactions, economic growth had to be cut 
back drastically in order to restore the balance of foreign 
trade. This policy now seems to have paid off. The question 
remains, however, whether after having reached equilibrium, 
a new industrial strategy can be launched to speed up growth 
while maintaining a balanced economy. 
The perspective presented is largely from the point of view 
of the development of the price system in Hungary, and the in- 
creasingly key role of prices in industrial strategy is pointed 
out. 
Structural Transformations 
The development of productive forces is proceeding hand in 
hand with a process of structural transformation. Marx - .- considered 
the change in the proportions of Class I (i.e. means oE production) 
and Class I1 (i.e. consumer goods) the most important. This 
proportion determines the distribution of consumer goods among 
different purposes and the distribution of the production factors 
between capital goods and consumption products. 
There is a difference in the economic content of harmonized 
development in the framework of the means of production and of 
consumption goods. ~nterrelations of the means of production 
are controlled -using the term of Oscar Lange - by the technical 
laws of balance sheets. Society's productive organization is an 
integral entity. The same goods are the product of a certain 
working process while they are means of the next working process. 
The value of goods expresses that the working processes separated 
in time and space are the aggregate of subsequent phases of the 
general working process. 
The proportion of capital and consumption goods is controlled 
by Government decisions about the allocation of the national 
income between accumulation and consumption. General equilibrium 
presupposes that demand and supply in capital and consumption 
goods are balanced both individually and in their interdependences. 
Industrial Strategies 
No doubt, the determination of industrial strategy is the 
most decisive issue in the course ofgeneral social economic 
development. By examining this problem concerning Hungary the 
traditional theory of socialist industrialization may be the 
starting point. One can read in the Political Economics of 
Socialism the following: "Industrialization began in capitalist 
countries historically with the development of the light industry 
and only after a lonq period was the heavy industry developed. 
Socialist industrialization started with the development of the 
heavy industry, which brings about essential savings in time and, 
based on up-to-date techniques, renders the reorganization of the 
whole national economy within the shortest possible period". 
(Politicheskaya Ekonomiya, ed. 3 Moscow, 1958). 
Socialist Industrialization 
The traditional theory of socialist industrialization is the 
---- 
generalization of the tendencies that characterized the industri- 
alization of the Soviet Union between the two world wars and which 
came to the force in the first decades after the Second World 
War in European socialist countries too. 
From the October Revolution up to the end of the Second 
World War the Soviet Union was the only socialist country in 
world economy. Thus, when introducing planning the Soviet 
Union had to treat her national economy as a quasi world economy, 
where foreign trade relations could only have a marginal role. 
In this historical situation accelerated development had to 
decide the industrial strategy of the Soviet Union. 
The success of the fulfilment of the first five year plan 
was explained in 1933 by the regime of strictest economization. 
(Problems of Leninism. Moscow 1945. The Results of the First 
Five-Year Plan). The report of the Secretary General illuminated 
in a very striking form the historical background of the indus- 
trialization program. According to this the aim was to trans- 
form the Soviet Union from a weak agrarian country depending on 
the whims of capitalist countries into an independent industrial 
power. 
After the Second World War the system of socialist world 
economy has emerged and so has the CMEA; that is to say the 
economic cooperation mechanism of the European socialist countries 
has been established. European countries which turned from the 
capitalist way of development to the socialist one, carried out 
an ambitious industrialization program, for which the economic 
facilities of the Soviet Union offered the possibility. With 
the accelerated rate of the exploitation of her natural resources 
the Soviet Union could meet not only her own needsbut could 
also supply a significant part of the energy carriers and raw 
materials needed by the European socialist countries. At the 
same time, when forming its own production structure, the 
Soviet Union was able to reckon with the export potentials of 
these countries. 
Economic Development 
Economic development harmonized with the traditional theory 
of socialist industrialization can be interpreted as the extensive 
stage of industrialization. The reserves of this kind of develop- 
ment had almost been exploited in the sixties. In the comprehen- 
sive program of socialist economic integration of the CMEA 
a d o p i n d i c a t e d  
that industrialization must be put on a new basis. This program 
emphasized the harmonization of national economic policies, 
industrial specialization and production cooperation and, 
generally, a selective industrialization based on efficiency. 
Chanaes in National Stratesies 
In the case of Hungary the way of extensive industrialization 
was characteristic of the period of 1950-1967. At that time 
achieving full employment was the principal aim of industriali- 
zation. But in the period of 1950-1956 the employment of 
housewives seeking jobs was the main line; as against this 
in the period 1957-1967 the task was to ensure jobs for the rural 
population who had become superfluous in agriculture due to the 
transformation into large scale farming. Parallel with this a 
new economic policy was inaugurated. Based on it the discrimi- 
natory treatment both of agriculture and of the infrastructure 
was put an end to. Concerning the consumption market the aim 
of the new economic policy was to re-establish the equilibrium 
of supply and demand. 
The shift-over to the way of intensive development pre- 
supposed a more consequent realization of efficiency. In Hungary 
with foreign trade sensitive economy, efficiency can be inter- 
preted only in the form of international competitiveness. Thus 
it was clear that under such conditions only such an economic 
control system could successfully work, which ensured a flexible 
adjustment to the steadily varying conditions of the international 
division of labour. This was the real background of the Hunga- 
rian economic reform carried out in 1968. Regulation based on 
obligatory plan targets was abolished and control through eco- 
nomic instruments has been introduced. 
A comprehensive analysis extended over the period 1967 to 
1974 brought clearly to the surface the very positive changes 
created by the new economic control system. In that p e r i o r  
economic growth sped up by 1-2% p.a. and varied between 5.5 to 
7%. ~abour productivity became slowly the only resource of 
economic growth. The deficit problem of the balance of payments 
in convertible currency areas, so very typical of the pre-reform 
period, came to an end. Development went on smoothly. We could 
collect foreign exchange reserves too, and this was achieved 
not by import restrictions, but what is more, despite the 
essential increase of the share of imported consumption goods in 
supply. This was 4-5% in the early sixties and reached almost 
20% in the early seventies. Thus supply improved in spite of 
the fact that a dynamic rise of the living standard could be 
observed. That period can be really characterized as a golden 
age of Hungarian economy. 
It was the oil price explosion on the world market at the 
end of 1973 that caused a break in this well-balanced develop- 
ment. Hungary belongs to the countries which suffered the 
greatest losses by the changes in relative world market prices. 
Overnight Hungary lost 10% of her national income which shows 
to what extent the terms of trade had deterioriated. The structural 
problem became acute and was expressed in the return of the 
deficit problem of international payments, but in this case 
in Rouble and non-Rouble areas alike. 
Since then we have had to live with this problem. The first 
reaction -as we can see it now- was a mistake. We supposed 
namely, that the best way to overcome this problem was to 
accelerate growth, and to pursue a very dynamic industrial 
strategy. But this accelerated indebtedness. Only in 1978 did 
it become clear that a consolidation process could be achieved 
with an essential slowing down of the rate of growth, combined 
with a decrease of the level of the domestic utilization of the 
national income. This concept determines government planning 
nowadays, when the five year plan for the period 1981-1985 is 
being prepared. The intention is to increase the GDP with the 
transformation of the production structure, which will increase 
the export potential, the share of convertible products and, by 
improving export efficiency, will mitigate the price losses we 
have suffered in the international division of labor. And what 
is more: planning should introduce -by the mid-eighties- a 
new path of growth on which a fairly dynamic rise of the living 
standard can be ensured again without jepardizing international 
equilibrium. 
The 1977 Resolution 
Prepared by a series of discussions in 1977, a resolution 
was made about long-term foreign trade policy and the guiding 
lines of developing the production structure. This resolution 
is the most important document at present, when the industrial 
strategy has to be worked out for the next five year plan cove- 
ring the period 1981-1985. According to this, the development 
of non-extractive industry has priority over the extractive 
sector in spite of the fact that the greater part of natural 
resources has to be imported. The standpoint in this respect 
is that too large a part of the available capital would be 
needed to accelerate exploitation, in spite of the fact that by 
this the share of production in the demand could be raised only 
insignificantly. Capital should increase the export capacity 
of the non-extractive sector and decrease the specific demand of 
energy and materials per value unit of production. 
According to the resolution, the qualification of the pro- 
duction structure and the elaboration of industrial strategy must 
be based on a method which unifies technical and economic aspects, 
but the resolution is going out from the point that in the evalu- 
ation of long-term development technical criteria are of primary 
importance. There are four criteria to which the resolution 
attributes particular significance. They are: 
- The volume of production and the magnitude of series 
- A scientific and technical background 
- An up-to-date marketing policy, and 
- the infrastructure 
The Role of Prices 
In the determination and implementation of industrial strategy, 
the greatest problem is connected with the price function. This 
is a very specific problem of socialist economy because in a 
planning system with nationalized means of prociuction it depends 
on government decisions whether the market mechanism should work 
and in what manner. This decision determines in this way whether 
the price can have an active role in the formation of industrial 
strategy or not. If it can, then the price has a structure 
orientation function, but if it cannot, then the price only adjusts 
itself to structure. 
Up to 1956 Hungarian economic policy pursued a path with a 
very limited price function but after that time it has proceeded 
a new line with the activation of the price function. In the 
very beginning after 1956, the abolishing of the obligatory 
delivery system of agrarian products and the introduction of the 
profit motive in the state-owned sectors with some element of 
the freedom of enterprises were characteristic of this new eco- 
nomic policy. This trend led in 1968 to the economic reform, 
which was implemented with the intention to establish a wide- 
scope freedom of enterprises with responsibility and risk-taking 
in their decisions. This trend has become stronger with the 
corrections in the regulation system carried out in 1980. 
But in connexion with the activation of the price function 
in the Hungarian debates about the economic mechanism, a dis- 
tinction was always made between the control of macro- and 
micro-structure. The view was overwhelming that enterprises could 
freely organize their production and marketinq, but development 
policy must be controlled centrally, based partly on budget 
subsidies and partly in a way that the government determines 
guiding lines for the credit policy implemented by the National 
Bank. 
When all is said and done, in connexion with industrial 
strategy and price function,discussions in Hungary have been 
focused on two issues. The first: how much the share of decen- 
tralized investments should be, compared to total productive 
investments. This is 50% or so. The second: what criteria 
should control government planning in the formation of industrial 
strategy. There were three factors which have contributed to the 
view that technical criteria should have priority over the price 
function. (a) Shortcomings in the price system; (b) uncertain- 
ties in price prognostication; (c) characteristics of cooperation 
in the CMEA. 
The 1980 Industrial Price System 
In the discussions preparing the resolution about industrial 
strategy we know more about the shortcomings of the industrial 
price system than about a price system which would be suitable 
for giving orientation in development policy. The guiding lines 
of perspective development of the price system were elaborated 
only in 1978; price re-arrangements could by introduced after 
that, and led in 1980 to the introduction of a new industrial 
price system. This can be characterized in the following way: 
- The domestic evaluation of natural resources adjusts it- 
self to the import price of the non-Rouble area; 
- The domestic evaluation of industrial products adjnsts 
itself to the export price of the non-Rouble area. 
In the field of natural resources, economic calculation 
based on world market price means to evaluate energy carriers 
and raw materials according to the more expensive import relation. 
In the course of price increases, the world market import price 
means for Hungary the more expensive relation, because CMEA 
contractual prices follow world market price increases year by 
year based on five years' average prices. 
In the processing industry, the adjustment of the wholesale 
price level to the export price level is the precondition of the 
point that profits or losses should reflect the actual positions 
of branches and enterprises in international competition. In a 
competitive price system understood in this way, the rank of 
profit margins is equal with the rank of efficiency. In this 
way can the industrial price system work as a rational yardstick 
and, as such, as an indispensable element of development policy. 
The question has emerged whether instead of the export price 
the import price would not be a better criterion in domestic 
pricing. Experts who stand for this view emphasize that in many 
cases new branches, i.e. enterprises are created with the intention 
of substituting import. But we started from the point that there 
was an essential gap between export and import prices, and the 
industrial price system must, first of all, give orientation for 
structure policy which increases the country's export potential. 
The price re-arrangement, i.e. the introduction of the new 
industrial price system in 1980, was actually a significant 
measure with the intention to improve the orientation function of 
the price in industrial strategy and, in this way, the resolution 
about improving the price system can be considered a correction 
of the 1977 resolution about the shaping of the production 
structure. 
Competitive Pricinq 
The shift-over from cost-plus-pricing to competitive 
pricing has created a new situation for enterprises. In this 
new situation, enterprises must organize production, taking into 
consideration realistic market relations, starting from the point 
that the qualification of their activity can only be based on 
what they have to pay for input goods and what they can get for 
their products. In this environment, of course, they are strongly 
interested in recognizing expectable market relations, i.e. in 
pursuing an investment and marketing policy by which competitive- 
ness can be maintained. 
In the development of the industrial production, structure 
price relations at present are only interesting because they are 
the basis for possible price relations of the future. But in 
structural discussions, some experts emphasized that one cannot 
take price prognostication seriously. Here we are at the point 
where the repeated debates about economy and technic should be 
touched upon. Many of us pointed out that the role of prices 
cannot be substituted with technical criteria. It is just the 
price or rather cost-price relations which bring various tech- 
nical parameters to a common denominator. Uncertainties in 
price prognostication are the risks involved in long-term 
decisions. We have not and cannot have correct information on 
what kind of capacities will penetrate world economy; what kind 
of new technologies will determine the conditions of production 
and how actually demand and supply relations will appear. Lastly, 
uncertainties in price prognostication can be traced back partly 
to the shortcomings of our knowledge about technical criteria 
valid for the future. 
Technic and economy determine each other organical1.y. One 
cannot substitute one with the other; nor can the one do without 
the other. Economic decisions are worthless without a realistic 
technical material background. But, in the same way, technical 
development can lead economy to a dead end if it is not harmonized 
with commodity relations. 
In commodity economy demand is the expression form of needs 
and supply of production. It is a quantity of needs and supply 
of production controlled by the price. That is why in a commodity 
economy only one signal system operates as a general indicator: 
namely the price. And that is why, if somebody is interested in 
pursuing a development policy on the line of efficiency, the 
price function simply cannot be missed. And if the aim of 
structural transformation is to restore the balance of inter- 
national payments and the improvement of the terms of trade then 
the orientation function of the price can be ensured only in a 
price system adjusted to the relative prices of foreign trade. 
This recognition has rendered the introduction of competitive 
pricing urgent. 
Three Markets Context 
Socialist countries, and thus Hungary too, organize their 
economies in three-market relations. These are the domestic, 
the CMEA and the world market. In the case of Hungary the share 
of the domestic market is 60% or so of the GDP, 22% falls to the 
CMEA and 18% to the world market. These markets have their 
specific requirements, which in the formation of industrial 
strategy must be taken into account. 
The specific feature of the CMEA market is bilaterally 
balanced trade and multi-lateral accounting. Here export and 
import product-mixes are confronted in a sense in which the 
tendency exist to achieve commodity structures on the side of 
export and import, which are equal in the average capital input 
or in the average labor input. These are such tendencies in 
international cooperation, which should be reckoned with, and 
for which -if one country is interested in getting indispensable 
products from the other- she must adjust herself to the other 
country's requirements independently of whether this is for her 
the best alternative from the point of efficiency. This tendency 
appears on foreign trade pricing too. Generally not the prices 
of simple export and import commodities but export and import 
price levels of product-mixes are discussed. Guiding lines 
fixed multilaterally for foreign trade pricing confine countries 
in bilateral price agreements only to a certain extent. In the 
supervision and changes of prices countries are interested in 
different ways, depending on the effect of the terms of trade. 
On a macro-level it seems to be a secondary problem in what way 
the additional incomes or losses caused by the change in the 
terms of trade get dispersed according to products. It springs 
from this very point that it is price structures and not single 
prices that are in the focus of attention. 
BY the way, product-mixes as such are gaining ground in 
connexions established on the world market too. For Hungary 
for instance it is much easier to trade with provisions, raw- 
materials and semi-finished goods on the markets of industrially 
developed countries than with capital goods or consumption 
products. This is so not because technical parameters for labor 
intensive products do not come up to the mark but because the 
intertwinement of industrial and trade companies on the market 
creates a quasi discriminative situation for outsiders, and 
this cannot be left out of consideration when the formation of 
industrial strategy is at stake. 
From all this we have come to the conclusion that industrial 
strategy is not simply a matter of price automatism. A definite 
structural policy of the government is needed for determining 
the investment structure, taking into consideration the possible 
lines of the international division of labor. The price should 
be activized where a flexible formation of the production struc- 
ture is not only possible but is a precondition of maximizing 
advantages. 
Industrial Development and Economic Growth 
The issue of industrial development is organically linked 
with general economic growth. There is, of course, a greater 
possibility for carrying out structural changes when the average 
rate of increase of the national economy is 6-82 a year, instead 
of 2-3%. A speedy growth was characteristic of Hungarian economy 
up to recent years and the rate of growth had to be cut down on 
account of the change of relative world market prices. 
The question which nowadays interests Hungarian economic 
policy most can be formulated as follows: if we succeed to 
re-establish equilibrium by cutting down the rate of growth, 
which can be achieved in 1981-82, whether a new industrial 
strategy can be launched based on which a speedier path of growth 
can be pursued while maintaining equilibrium. The solution 
of this is not yet in our hands. 
Crude oil is only one on the list of several hundreds of 
different natural resources. But it is the most important. 
A calculation carried out in 1962 showed that energy carriers 
gave two thirds of the value of the total of exploited minerals 
in our world, and it was 40% that fell to the share of crude oil. 
But, if we made this calculation based on the new relative prices, 
the share of energy holders would surpass three fourths and 
crude oil would achieve 60% or so. 
This picture illuninates that the adjustment to varying 
relative prices in the case of energy carriers is profoundly 
different from all other minerals, at least in two respects: 
If the task is replacement, the question is what possibilities 
are given to substitute something that is almost 80% -and in 
the case of crude oil is 60%- of the total. What type of 
industrial strategy can ensure a dynamic development if we know 
that it is just the widespread utilization of hydrocarbons as 
raw materials in various branches of the chemical industry, that 
a speed up of development could be insured by? 
It follows from this that the rate of economic growth must 
be slowed down if -for this reason or for others- we have to 
economize with crude oil consumption. And this is actually the 
effect on the Hungarian economy of the new relative oil prices. 
The rate of growth had to be cut down on account of difficulties 
in financing import and not because a larger quantity of import 
would not have been available. The problem is actually not the 
lack of export capacities but the specific requirements connected 
with additional energy import. To make this clear: in the CMEA, 
or rather in the Soviet-Hungarian trade agreement, an import quota 
for crude oil is fixed and is financed in the normal clearing 
settlement. But Hungary can have a larger quantity only based 
on special agreements, counterbalanced with convertible currency 
or products at actual world market prices. This is the point 
from which difficulties arise. 
Therefore Hungary has come to the conclusion that economic 
growth had to be curbed on the middle range, at least until a 
new course of growth could be worked out. Fron. analyses the 
picture can be seen that perhaps a 4% annual growth -instead 
of 6-8% characteristic of the early 1970s- can be hoped for 
the mid-eighties. 
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